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Abstract
We analyze the global imbalances and the required adjustments for rebalancing in current
accounts and real exchange rates. We set up a two-country two-sector model for the US-
China with two asymmetries. First, we assume that the size of China initially is one third
of the US but its size becomes half of the US in the next ten years consistent with the fast
growth expectations in China. Secondly, we assume that China initially runs a net export
surplus against the US. Then we quantitatively study two adjustment scenarios. First scenario,
called Slow Adjustment, assumes that in the process of growth, Chinese demand composition
moves more towards domestic non-tradable sector. In this case, Chinese real exchange rate
appreciates gradually and net export surplus also decreases slowly. Second scenario, called
Quick Adjustment, assumes that in addition to the higher non-tradable share in output,
net export surplus against US goes to zero quickly in ve years. In this case, net export
adjustment happens quickly and real exchange rates in China also appreciate faster and at a
higher rate than Slow Adjustment case. Even though, global imbalances are eliminated faster
in the Quick Adjustment case, high real appreciation in China hurts importers in the US. A
comparison in terms of output shows that Slow Adjustments is preferred for both countries.
Key Words: Global imbalances, Current accounts, Exchange rate adjustments.
Jel Classication: F32, F36, F41
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1 Introduction
Global imbalances are seen as one of the main driving forces of the global economic crisis and have been
taken responsible for the weak recovery thereafter. Since the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, where leaders of
the Group of Twenty (G-20) countries committed to work in a coordinated way and thus adopted the
Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, this issue has become a major discussion topic
both in research and policy circles. The backbone of the framework is a multilateral process through
which root causes and the impediments to adjustment in those countries are to be identied and solutions
are to be recommended. Within this context, countries having large imbalances, such as USA and China
deserve a special attention. Although there is a unanimous agreement on the unsustainability of such
large imbalances, yet countries seem to diverge on how (fast) to diminish them. While decit country
(e.g. USA) insists on immediate adjustment through nominal appreciation of the currency of surplus
country (e.g. China), the later prefers a more gradual move, mainly through real appreciation. In this
paper, we analyze how the given level of imbalances between the US and China would disappear under
di¤erent adjustment scenarios. For this purpose, we set up a two-country (the US and China) two-sector
(tradables and non-tradables) world economy with endogenous labor decision and capital accumulation.
There are two asymmetries across the countries in our model. First, we assume that initially Chinese
output is one third of the US output. However, given the faster growth in China, we also assume that
Chinese output increases to the half of the US output in ten years. Second, we assume that China runs
a 5.5 percent net export surplus against the US. With these initial arrangements, we want to make a
realistic calibration of the model similar to the data. Then we analyze the impact of di¤erent adjustment
scenarios.
The two scenarios that we compare, called Slow and Quick Adjustments, look at the implications for
the real exchange rate, terms of trade and output. Slow Adjustment case assumes that along with the
fast growth in China, demand moves towards domestic nontradable sectors. In this case, Chinese terms
of trade depreciates due to fast growth in China, which increases the supply of Chinese traded goods
vis-a-vis the US traded goods. However, the move in the domestic demand towards the nontradable
goods appreciates the Chinese currency. Overall US producers benet from the cheap Chinese goods
and the net export surplus of China decreases from 5.5 percent of output to 3 percent of output in ten
years. In contrast, with the Quick Adjustment scenario we assume that in addition to faster growth and
demand shift towards nontradable goods, Chinese net exports are forced to go to zero in ve years. This
additional and fast adjustment of the net exports leads to a large terms of trade and real exchange rate
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appreciation. More expensive tradable good imports from China hurts the producers in the US. When we
compare the results of the two scenarios in terms of nal outputs in countries, we nd that both countries
get a higher output prole under the slow adjustment case.
In the literature, there are lots of studies looking at the several dimensions of the adjustment process
of global imbalances. For example, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2005, 2007) quanties the required changes
in the real exchange rates for imbalances between the US and the rest of world to clear. They use a
multi-country endowment economy for their model and make a static analysis. Similarly, Mejean et al.
(2011) uses a three-country endowment economy of the world with tradable and nontradable sectors.
They estimate size of required adjustment in terms of trade and real exchange rates to decrease the
current account decit of the US by 1 percent of the GDP. In contrast to these endowment models,
Faruqee et al. (2007, 2008) set up a production economy of four blocks of countries and they rst try
to present cases such that the given level of imbalances can be generated in the model and then they
analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent policies on the imbalances. Their study o¤ers a very rich framework to
study the dynamics of imbalances and the interactions of several structural factors such as tari¤s and
competition. Similarly, Vogel (2010) uses a multi-region macroeconomic model with Forex intervention to
study the Chinas external surplus. Author looks at the dynamics of imbalances and nds that oating
the Chinese currency would contribute to the balancing of imbalances. Straub and Thimann (2010)
studies the adjustment in China in a multi-country model. They look at the possible adjustment process
under di¤erent scenarios such as productivity growth, labor supply movements and exible exchange
rates. Our paper is also a production economy model. We have two countries and two-sectors in our
model, which is simpler than the models of Faruqee et al. (2007, 2008), Vogel (2010) and Straub and
Thimann (2010). But distinct from these papers and from the related literature, we explicitly study
the speed of adjustment process and nd that quantitative implications can di¤er signicantly between
di¤erent speed scenarios. This nding points to the importance of the pace of the adjustment as also
emphasized by Krugman (2007).
Plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the data, Section 3 presents the model and Section
4 studies the simulation results regarding the adjustment scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
3
2 Data
Figure 1 plots the current account balance data from IMF-IFS database for both countries as percent of
GDP from 1990 to 2010. Around 1990, both China and the US had smaller current account balances.
Towards the end of the 1990s, China has started accumulating current account surpluses and the US
started running current account decits. However, even at the end of the 1990s, current account imbal-
ances in both countries were less than 5 percent (1.4 in China and -3.2 in the US). Imbalances in the
current accounts started growing larger in 2000s. By 2006, current account as a share of GDP was -6
percent in the US and 9 percent in China. Global nancial crisis of 2008-2009 decreased the level of
imbalances in countries from their peaks somehow. But the current account balances by the end of 2010
were 5.2 percent in China and -3.2 percent in the US, still signicant numbers.
Figure 2 presents the foreign asset positions of China and the US starting from 1990. This data
is taken from an updated and extended version of the dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). As shown in the graph, in 1990, both countries had very low levels of net foreign asset positions
(2 percent in China and -5.6 percent in the US). However, with the persistent current account surpluses
in China and decits in the US, net foreign asset positions started to move to large values. By 2007,
Chinas positive net foreign asset position reached 22 percent of its GDP. In contrast, the US recorded
a negative foreign asset position at 17 percent of its GDP. These numbers support that imbalances have
also been growing as a stock. In Figure 3, we also check the bilateral trade positions of the US and
China to see how much of the total imbalances are coming from bilateral trade in goods and services.
This data comes from the US Department of Commerce and PRC National Bureau of Statistics. We see
that for the years 2007-2010, almost all of the net export surplus of China comes from its trade with the
US. In these years, Chinese net export surplus against the rest of the world was an average of 5.28 %
of GDP and against the US it was 5.63 %. In the same period, the US net export decit against the
rest of the world was 4.86 % of its GDP and against China it was 1.8 %. These numbers support our
numeric exercise in the paper. We assume that initially China runs a net export surplus of 5.5 % against
the US and also assume that the Chinese GDP is one thirds of the US GDP. Then this would imply
that the US also runs a net export decit of 1.83 % against China in our exercise. These numbers are
closely in line with the bilateral trade ows between the US and China as shown in Figure 3. In the data
most of the current account is from the trade balance and the foreign income balance is a small portion.
However, in the model, we make our simulations and present our results in terms of net exports. To be
more consistent and proper with the use of these terms, up to the model part we use terms of current
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accountsand global imbalancesas it is the more common to use these terms when talking about the
data. In the model part we use the term of net exportsto be more specic.
Figure 1: Current Accounts as % of GDP Figure 2: Net Foreign Assets as % of GDP
These imbalances were not conned to the US and China, and large current account imbalances have
been observed in most economies. Figure 4 shows average of the absolute values of current account
balances for 64 developed and developing countries over the period of 1990-20101 . In 1990, average
current account balance (in terms of absolute values) was 3.4 percent of the GDP. The current account
imbalances increased slowly in 1990s, and gained speed in 2000s reaching to 7 percent of GDP in 2008.
With global nancial crisis of 2008-2009, imbalances decreased to 4.8 percent as of 2010. This number
shows that global imbalances still remains large even after the global crisis.
1Data is from IMF. Countries are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
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Figure 3: Net Export Balance as % of respective GDP
Figure 4: Average Current Accounts (Absolute Value)
as % of GDP for 64 Countries
These "global imbalances" have attracted lots of attention from academia and policy makers. Some
papers in the literature explain these imbalances as equilibrium outcomes of several market forces. For
example, in an endogenous portfolio model, Caballero et al. (2008) show that ability of the US to
issue safe assets leads to current account decits in the US. Similarly, Mendoza et al. (2009) set up a
two country (developing vs. developed) endogenous portfolio model. They show that nancial market
imperfections in the developing countries makes them demand safe assets from developed countries. This
e¤ect produces current account surpluses in developing countries. The policy implications and required
adjustments in exchange rates to close the imbalances are also discussed extensively in the literature. For
example, in a series of papers, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2001, 2005, 2007) analyze the sustainability of the
US current account decits and present quantitative results on how much the terms of trade and real
exchange rate needs to change in case of a correction in current accounts. Krugman (2007) notes that
not only the size, but also the speed of adjustment is important. Global imbalances have implications for
the international monetary system also as shown by Salvatore (2005, 2011) and McKinnon and Schnabl
(2011)2 .
In our model, we make a dynamic quantitative analysis of the required adjustments in the exchange
rates to lessen the global imbalances. Our analysis is dynamic in the sense that we include time dimension
into the adjustments by studying di¤erent speed scenarios. To make the analysis more realistic, we also
2There is a vast literature on global imbalances. For some of the papers, see: Bernanke (2005), Blanchard et al. (2005),
Calvo and Talvi (2006), Edwards (2005), Eichengreen (2006), Engel and Rogers (2006), Faruqee et al. (2007), Feldstein
(2011), Fogli and Perri (2006), Ghironi et al. (2007), Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), McKinnon
(2009), Mejean et al. (2011), Rogo¤ (2007), Zhang and Wan (2008).
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incorporate the fast growth expectations and the structural demand shifts in China.
3 Model
In this section, we develop a two-country and two-sector, tradable and non-tradable, production economy
model with a single bond. Our world economy consists of two countries, one representing a developed
country (the US) and the other representing emerging country (China). Countries are indexed as i = U;C
representing the US and China respectively. In each country rms use capital, labor and sector specic
technology to produce perfectly tradable inputs and nontradable inputs. There are intermediate goods
rms in each country which aggregate tradable inputs from the other country with the tradable inputs
that they produced to form tradable intermediate goods for the nal good. The nal good rms combine
tradable intermediates and nontradable inputs to form the nal good. Production sharing takes place
in tradable inputs, so countries use both home and foreign tradable inputs to produce their respective
tradable intermediate goods. Then, they combine this tradable intermediate good with non-tradable
input to produce their distinctive nal goods, which later to be consumed or invested by the households
of each countries.
Our model has a similar structure with that of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995), Stockman and
Tesar (1995) and Corsetti et al. (2008). Di¤erent from these models we abstract from uncertainty
since we are interested in movements in the steady state in contrast to movements around the steady
state.
3.1 Firmsproblem
The perfectly competitive tradable good producer rms in each country combine capital and labor with
their sector specic technology in a Cobb-Douglas production function to obtain the tradable good. The
production function in mathematical form is:
Xi;T;t = i;T;tn

i;T;tk
1 
iT;;t i = U;C: (1)
Total amount of tradable good produced is Xi;T;t, the technological level (productivity) of the rm is
denoted as i;T;t, the amount of labor employed in the production is ni;T;t, and the amount of capital
used is ki;T;t. The subscript i is used to denote the countries, subscript T is used to denote the good
that is tradable, and the subscript t is used to denote time period. After production takes place at
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time t, tradable rm in country i sells XiC;T;t part of its output to China and XiU;T;t part to the U.S.
Consequently, Chinese exports to the U.S. ( or the U.S. imports from China) will be XCU;T;t and Chinese
imports from the U.S. (or the U.S. exports to China) will be XUC;T;t. Remaining parts of XCC;T;t and
XUU;T;t are used in home tradable intermediate goods production in China and the U.S., respectively.
Therefore, we have the following resource constraint for tradable input production:
Xi;T;t = XiC;T;t +XiU;T;t i = U;C: (2)
There is production sharing between countries in the sense that both countries use each others
tradable inputs to produce their respective tradable intermediate goods. We assume that there are
perfectly competitive intermediate tradable good producers in each country that combine tradable inputs
from their own country with imports of tradable inputs from the other country to produce intermediate
tradable goods. Intermediate tradable good producers use a constant elasticity of substitution production
technology as follows
Yi;Tr;t =

v
1
i
i X
1  1i
Ci;T;t + (1  vi)
1
iX
1  1i
Ui;T;t
 i
i 1
i = U;C (3)
where i is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution between the U.S.s tradable input XUi;T and
Chinas tradable input XCi;T , and vC is the share of Chinas tradable input in country is intermediate
tradable goods production, where vC = 1   vU . Taking Chinas tradable input price as numeraire
(PC;T = 1) and denoting relative prices of the U.S. tradable inputs as PU;T , we can derive the tradable
intermediate goods price index for the U.S. and China as follows:
Pi;Tr;t =
h
vi + (1  vi)P 1 iU;T;t
i 1
1 i
i = U;C (4)
There are also perfectly competitive nontradable good producers in each country which operate similar
to the tradable good producer rms. They produce with the Cobb-Douglas functional form but with
di¤erent technological levels:
Xi;N;t = i;N;tn

i;N;tk
1 
iN;;t i = U;C: (5)
Total amount of nontradable good produced is Xi;N;t, the technological level (productivity) of the rm
is denoted as i;N;t, the amount of labor employed in the production is ni;N;t and the amount of capital
used is ki;N;t. The subscript N is used the denote that the good is nontradable.
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Once the international trade in inputs between countries takes place and production of intermediate
tradable goods is performed, competitive nal good producers in each country combine their own in-
termediate tradable output with countrys non-tradable inputs to produce the nal goods. Final good
producers also use constant elasticity of substitution production technology:
Yi;t =


1
i
i Y
1  1i
i;Tr;t + (1  i)
1
iX
1  1i
i;N;t
 i
i 1
i = U;C (6)
where i is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution between intermediate tradable goods Yi;Tr and
non-tradable inputs Xi;N , and i is the share of tradable goods in the nal goods production. From the
optimization problem of the rm, we can derive the nal goods price index as follows:
Pi;t =
h
iP
1 i
i;Tr;t + (1  i)P 1 ii;N;t
i 1
1 i
i = U;C (7)
For both countries there are two more relevant prices, i.e. terms of trade and real exchange rates. We
dene terms of trade, ToT , from the perspective of China, as the ratio of its export prices to its import
prices; and real exchange rate, ReR, as the ratio of Chinese nal goods prices to the U.S. nal goods
prices:
ToTt =
PC;T;t
PU;T;t
and ReRt =
PC;t
PU;t
(8)
An increase in the ToT means an appreciation of terms of trade for China by making its export prices
more expensive or import prices less expensive. An increase in ReR means an appreciation of real
exchange rates for China and a depreciation for the U.S. In the simulations, we will be also interested in
the dynamics of net exports over output, which are dened as:
nxyi;t =
Pi;T;tXij;T;t   Pj;T;tXji;T;t
Pi;tYi;t
i; j = U;C i 6= j
3.2 Householdsproblem
Households provide labor services ni;T;t to tradable and ni;N;t to nontradable rms in their countries at
the wage rates of wi;T;t and wi;N;t. They also own the capital stock in both sectors (ki;T;t and ki;N;t) and
rent it to the rms at rates qi;T;t and qi;N;t. Both labor and capital are mobile between sectors within
the country but the are immobile between countries. Households also hold an internationally traded
bond Bi;t that is in zero net supply. So income of households consists of wage income from labor supply,
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rent income from capital supply, and the interest income from the bond. Households use their income to
nance their consumption ci;t, investment in tradable and nontradable capital, and to buy new bonds.
They also pay adjustment costs for capital and bond changes. Then the budget constraint for households
in country i is,
Pi;tci;t + Pi;t[ki;T;t+1   (1  )ki;T;t] + Pi;t
2
(ki;T;t+1   ki;T;t)2
+Pi;t[ki;N;t+1   (1  )ki;N;t] + Pi;t
2
(ki;N;t+1   ki;N;t)2 + PB;tBi;t+1 + PB;t

2
(Bi;t+1 B)2
= Bi;t + wi;T;tni;T;t + wi;N;tni;N;t + qi;T;tki;T;t + qi;N;tki;N;t (9)
where  is the adjustment cost parameter for capital stock,  is the depreciation rate and 
 is the
adjustment cost parameter for bond holdings. Representative households in both economies have constant
relative risk aversion type of preferences over consumption of the nal goods and labor:
Ui;t(ci;t; ni;T;t; ni;N;t) =
[c i;t(1  ni;T;t   ni;N;t)(1  )](1 )
1  
where  is used to calibrate the steady state value of total labor and  is the risk aversion parameter.
Households maximize the net present value of their lifetime utility
1X
t=0
tUi;t(ci;t; ni;T;t; ni;N;t) subject to
the budget constraint.
3.3 Resource Constraints
Since there is no trade in nal goods, nal goods in each country are used for consumption, investment
and adjustment costs and we have the following resource constraint for country i:
Yi;t = ci;t + [ki;T;t+1   (1  )ki;T;t] + [ki;N;t+1   (1  )ki;N;t]
+

2
(ki;T;t+1   ki;T;t)2 + 
2
(ki;N;t+1   ki;N;t)2 + 

2
(Bi;t+1 B)2 i = U;C: (10)
Also there is only one bond in the international nancial markets and the net supply is zero, giving
us:
BU;t +BC;t = 0 (11)
3.4 Calibration
Most parameter values chosen are standard and are from the literature. We follow mostly Corsetti et al.
(2008) to calibrate our parameters. For now, we assume that all the model parameters are symmetric
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across two countries except the sizes of the countries. Productivity ratios are chosen such that the
U.S. nal production is 3 times of Chinese nal production, i.e. PU;t=1YU;t=1 = 3PU;t=1YU;t=1. Then
we assume that over the ten years, the Chinese GDP will reach to the half size of the US GDP. The
assumption that China will grow from one third to half of the US GDP in ten years is based on the recent
growth numbers. Using World Development Indicators of World Bank, by 2008, the US GDP was 14.3
trillion dollars and the Chinese GDP was 4.5 trillion dollars giving a ratio of around one third. Average
real GDP growth over the period of 1980-2008 (excluding recent crisis period) was 10 % in China and
2.87 % in the US. If these growth numbers continue, then the Chinese output would reach half of the US
output in seven years. But to be cautious, we assume that this convergence takes place in ten years.
Rest of the parameters are chosen as follows.  is chosen such that labor share in income is 2=3
in both tradable and nontradable sectors. Intermediate tradable producers combine home tradable in-
puts with imported tradable inputs. The parameter that governs the home input share in intermediate
tradables production, v, is chosen as 0:72, which produces a home bias. The elasticity of intertemporal
substitution between home tradable inputs and imported tradable inputs, , is chosen as 3=2. The share
of intermediate tradables goods in nal goods, , is 0:55. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution
between tradable intermediate goods and nontradable inputs, , is chosen as 3=4. This value is smaller
than the one between home and foreign tradables so that tradables are more substitutable than tradables
and nontradables. Depreciation rate of capital, , is the annual depreciation rate 10%. Consumption
share in Cobb-Douglas utility function,  , is chosen as 0:35 to match the steady state total labor of
1=3. Risk aversion parameter, , is the standard value of 2: Discount factor for households, , is 1/1.04,
implying a risk-free interest rate of 4%. Time period under this calibration is one year. An important
remaining value to calibrate is the bond holdings or net exports of the countries. We calibrate the steady
state value of the Chinese bond holdings, BC;, as to match the net exports over GDP ratio of 5:5% for
China. In other words, China will run a net export surplus against the U.S. in the initial steady state.
All the parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
4 Simulations
In this part, we look at two di¤erent simulations concerning our model. At the calibrated initial steady
state at time t = 1, China runs a net export surplus over GDP of 5:5% against the U.S. and ratio of
Chinese GDP to the US GDP is 1=3. Other than these two di¤erences across the countries, all the
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remaining structural factors are the same. Then, in the rst scenario, which is called Slow Adjustment,
we let China to grow both in tradable and nontradable sectors along with a slow shift from tradables to
nontradables in the nal goods production. We let all these changes to happen in one period increments
such that at period t = 10 Chinese GDP grows to half of the US GDP. With these changes taking place,
we follow what happens to net exports, real exchange rates and as a result to global imbalances. In
the second scenario, which is called Quick Adjustment, in addition to the changes in the rst scenario,
we also force net exports of China to fall to zero quickly in four periods. Then we compare the results
of simulations across these two scenarios. Here, in these simulations we solve for new steady states
at each period with the new parameters, not the transition path after a structural parameter changes.
However, given that changes are in small increments, the time period is one year and the adjustment
cost parameters are very small, we can assume that model would converge to new steady state quickly
around a year.
In the rst scenario, we start with the initial points described above and then there are two main
changes in the Chinese economy. First, both tradable and nontradable technology levels in China will
improve over time. Also, consistent with the overall observation in other countries, we assume that
tradable technology growth is more than two times that of nontradable sector. The assumption that
over the convergence process productivity in the tradables grows faster than nontradables is based on the
empirical evidence from the literature. For example, Strauss and Ferris (1996) show that in 14 OECD
countries, over the period of 1970-1990, average productivity growth in tradables was around two times
of average productivity growth in nontradables. Cova et al. (2010) shows that in emerging Asia and in
China, for the period of 1975-2004, the productivity growth in tradables were around two times that of
nontradables. Using these evidence, we make the assumptions that productivity growth in tradables will
be larger than in nontradables. In the US, however there is no change in the technology levels. This does
not mean that the U.S. economy does not grow in reality, but we assume that the U.S. economy is on
its balanced growth path. Second, in the initial steady state, we have the share of nontradables in nal
production as 45%, and in the simulations we increase this ratio to 55% in China to reect that as China
gets richer its share of nontradable goods will increase. Exact parameter values are given in Table 2 for
this scenario.
In Figure 5, we plot the results of rst scenario with marked lines. With increases in the tradable
technology of China, terms of trade will depreciate, i.e. Chinese tradable goods compared to the US
tradable goods will become cheaper. This depreciation is more than 15% at the end. Since, Chinese goods
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are much cheaper, Chinese exports to the US increases around 30%. Normally, Chinese tradable inputs
and the US tradable inputs are substitutes, but with growth, China uses also more of the US tradable
goods and Chinese imports from the US increases also around 15%. Then, combined overall e¤ect of
terms of trade depreciation and increased imports from the US leads to a decrease in the net exports
of China from 5.5% to 3%. Another crucial element in this adjustment is that China does not change
the initial international portfolio position to avoid decreases in the net exports. For the nontradable
sector, since the substitutability between tradables and nontradables is low and there is a structural
move towards the nontradable goods in GDP, production of nontradables also increase signicantly. The
move towards a higher share of nontradables in GDP works like a demand shocks for nontradable sectors
and nontradable prices increase. This increase in the nontradablesprices compensates the depreciation
e¤ect and the real exchange rate appreciates in China as seen in the gure. The process itself also benets
the US in the sense that imports from China are cheaper now and as a result the intermediate tradables
production increases in the US as well. Coupled with a small increase in the nontradable sector, overall
GDP increases slightly in the US. In scenario 1, the adjustment of global imbalances is slow. Net exports
decrease from 5.5% to 3% in nine years and appreciation of real exchange rate is less than double digit.
As an alternative case, we also ask what happens if the net export adjustment was larger and quicker.
In this case, instead of leaving net exports to be determined in equilibrium for a given level of bond
holdings, we force net exports of China to go to zero in four years by changing the international portfolio
position. Therefore, this new scenario (Quick Adjustment) scenario includes exogenous movements of net
exports in addition to other forces in rst scenario. As presented in Table 3, in addition to the changes in
Table 2, we have net exports as another parameter to change. It should be noted that, since with quick
adjustment of net exports, real exchange rates appreciate more in China compared to the slow adjustment
case, leading to higher GDP ratios also. To match the nal GDP ratios of 0.5 for both scenarios, in the
second scenario we increase technology parameters less to compensate the appreciation e¤ect.
Figure 5 presents the simulations of second scenario where there is quick adjustment of net exports
with smooth lines. Most contrasting change happens in net exports such that it moves from 5.5% to 0%
in four years compared to a slow adjustment to 3% in nine years. To make this large and quick change in
net exports, Chinese terms of trade needs to appreciate. At the same initial four periods, terms of trade
appreciates around 9% making Chinese tradable inputs expensive. Consequently, since the US goods are
cheaper in relative terms now, Chinese imports from the US increase around 20% in four years, much
larger than the value of 7% in slow adjustment case. Also, since Chinese goods are more expensive,
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Chinese exports to the US decreases around 12%, in stark contrast to the slow adjustment case where
exports were increasing. This decrease in exports coupled with increase in imports enables the large
adjustment in net exports of China. The terms of trade appreciation together with the structural shift
towards nontradable goods lead to a large appreciation of real exchange rates in China, around 18% at
the end compared to 6% in slow adjustment case.3 Overall the quick adjustment and large appreciation
in China leads to a lower growth in GDP. The quick adjustment case is not also very benecial for the
US in terms of GDP except that it closes the global imbalances quickly. Since Chinese goods are more
expensive now, the US intermediate tradable good producers will be able to buy less Chinese inputs
and their production will be lower compared to balanced growth path and GDP will be also lower than
balanced growth path equilibrium by around 1%.
Our result that slow adjustment is preferable is robust to parameter changes. For example, we
also simulate the model with a lower elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables. In
our benchmark case, we have an elasticity of 34=0.75. Quantitative results of these two simulations are
presented in Table 4. In the benchmark calibration with 0.75, we nd that in slow adjustment, ToT would
depreciate 16.57 %, and ReR would appreciate 5.73 %, in contrast to quick adjustment case where ToT
would appreciate 5.60 %, and ReR would appreciate more 18.35 %. It seems that in quick adjustment,
there is a faster correction in ReR, however, in terms of outputs; slow adjustment is preferable for both
countries as seen in the table. When we simulate with a lower elasticity of 0.45 we nd that our results are
robust to this change. As before, we nd that in slow adjustment, ToT would depreciate 8.22 %, and ReR
would appreciate 10.57 %, in contrast to quick adjustment case where ToT would appreciate a lot 24.49
%, and ReR would appreciate a lot also 27.69 %. However, in terms of outputs, slow adjustment is still
preferable for both countries. So all the directions of changes (appreciate/depreciate, increase/decrease)
stay the same and main result of the paper that slow adjustment is preferable is robust. Only change
happens in the magnitudes.
When interpreting our results regarding the adjustment process, we should keep in mind that our
model is a real international business cycle model and does not include nominal variables, monetary
or exchange rate policies. However, in some simple ways, we can infer about the dynamics of nominal
variables, too. To give an example, the denition of real exchange rate in the model is ReRt = PC;t=PU;t.
If we had a nominal model, the new denition would be ReRt = PC;t=(PU;tEY=$;t); where EY=$;t is
3Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2007) nds that between 17 and 64 percent depreciation of dollar is required for imbalances to
clear. Mejean et al. (2011) nds that for a reduction 1 percent of GDP in current account decit of the US, there needs to
be a 15 percent depreciation of dollar. Our quantitative results are on the low side of these ndings.
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the nominal exchange rate showing how much Yuan an US Dollar worth. Lets assume that PU is
constant and ReR appreciates. In the real model, this happens through increase in the price level in
China, whereas in the nominal model it happens through a combination of increase in domestic prices or
nominal appreciation ( a decrease in EY=$). So even if monetary policy resists a nominal appreciation, as
long as the country keeps open capital accounts in the international nancial markets, then in equilibrium
ReR would appreciate through higher domestic prices and all of the adjustment in ReR would still take
place. But the real life policy options are much wider than this simple representation of policy. For
example, in the model, portfolio side is taken exogenously and there are no valuation e¤ects. In real life
policy environment, monetary policy can endogenously play with the portfolio position of the country
through FX reserve policy and therefore a¤ect the level of real exchange rates4 .
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the role of real exchange rate adjustments in global imbalances and current
account rebalancing. We quantitatively study how much terms of trade and real exchange rate between
the US and China would change under di¤erent adjustment scenarios. We take into the account the time
dimension explicitly by looking at the speed of adjustments. To make the analysis more realistic, we
also incorporate into the analysis the fast growth expectations and structural demand shifts in China.
We quantitatively study two cases. First case, called Slow Adjustment case, assumes that in ten years
China grows from one third to half of the US GDP and its domestic demand composition moves more
towards nontradable goods. Fast growth in China increases the supply of Chinese goods and depreciates
the terms of trade. The cheaper imports from China benets the tradable producers in the US. Shift of
demand towards nontradables in China, however, appreciates the Chinese currency. Overall, net export
surplus of China decreases from 5.5 percent to 3 percent in ten years. In the second case, called Quick
Adjustment scenario, in addition to rst scenario, we assume the Chinese net export surplus goes to zero
in ve years. This required quick adjustment of current accounts leads to a large appreciation of term of
trade. The resulting high prices of imports from China hurts the tradable producers in the US. Demand
shift towards nontradable goods in China puts extra appreciation pressures on the Chinese currency
leading to a much higher appreciation in the second case. Overall, in the quick adjustment case, net
4 If China can succesfully resists against appreciation pressures, then our results would be upper bounds of the possible
adjustment process. For discussions on the xed vs oating exchange rates for imbalances, see Straub and Thimann (2010),
Vogel (2010) and Mejean et al. (2011).
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export imbalances decrease faster, terms of trade appreciates in contrast to a depreciation and current
appreciation is much larger compared to the slow adjustment case. The distinction between the two
scenarios corresponds roughly the di¤erence between the substitution and income e¤ects in a standard
demand analysis. Whilst the quick adjustment situation would only have a similar e¤ect as substitution
e¤ect, and result in substitution of US goods for those that would have previously imported from China,
in the slow adjustment scenario both income and substitution e¤ects would be the case, because Chinese
consumers, thanks to real rather than nominal appreciation, would at least partially ll the gap created
by diminishing US imports from China. Thus one may argue that the slow adjustment is pareto optimal.
In parallel with this analogy, large terms of trade appreciation, which is crucial to increase the US exports
and decrease the US imports and as a result close down the net export decit, in quick adjustment case,
hurts the sectors in the US that uses Chinese inputs. A comparison in terms of GDP proles over the
ten years shows that slow adjustment case is preferred for both countries.
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Table 1 Calibration
Denition Parameter Value
Labor share in production  2=3
Home input share in intermadiate tradables production v 0:72
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution bw home and foreign tradable inputs  3=2
Intermediate tradable goods share in nal goods production  0:55
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution bw intermediate tradable and nontradable  3=4
Depreciation rate of capital  0:1
Targeted total steady state labor of 1/3  0:35
Risk aversion parameter  2
Discount factor for households  1=1:04
Targeted the U.S. size as 3 times of China at time t = 1 U;TC;T 6
Targeted the U.S. size as 3 times of China at time t = 1 U;Nc;N 6
Targeted net exports surplus over GDP of 5.5% for China at time t = 1 BC  0:8
Adjustment cost parameter for capital  0:00074
Adjustment cost parameter for bonds 
 0:0001
Table 2: Scenario 1 (Slow Adjustment) parameters
Parameter in China t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 t = 7 t = 8 t = 9 t = 10
Tradable Technology C;T;t 1:000 1:054 1:111 1:171 1:235 1:301 1:372 1:446 1:524 1:606
Nontradable Technology N;T;t 1:000 1:027 1:054 1:082 1:111 1:141 1:171 1:202 1:235 1:267
Tradable Share in China vC 0:550 0:539 0:528 0:517 0:506 0:494 0:483 0:472 0:461 0:450
Table 3: Scenario 2 (quick adjustment) parameters
Parameter in China t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 t = 7 t = 8 t = 9 t = 10
Tradable Technology C;T;t 1:000 1:031 1:063 1:096 1:130 1:164 1:200 1:238 1:276 1:315
Nontradable Technology N;T;t 1:000 1:015 1:031 1:047 1:063 1:079 1:096 1:112 1:130 1:147
Tradable Share in China vC 0:550 0:539 0:528 0:517 0:506 0:494 0:483 0:472 0:461 0:450
Net Exports in China nxyC;t 5:50 3:95 2:52 1:21 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
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Table 4: robustness with respect to 
Elasticity of substitution
Between Intermediate Tradables and Nontradables 
0.75 0.25
Speed of Adjustment Slow Quick Slow Quick
% Change from t = 1 to t = 10
Terms of Trade -16.57 5.60 -8.22 24.49
Real Exchange Rate 5.73 18.35 10.57 27.69
US GDP 2.62 -0.94 1.22 -3.13
Chinese GDP 46.92 26.93 31.68 9.21
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Figure 5: Steady State Simulations of Two Adjustment Scenarios
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